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STATE, PLAINTIFF, V. CHILTON, DEFENDANT
STATE, PLAINTIFF, V. TERRY, DEFENDANT
COMMON PLEAS COURT, CUYAHOGA COUNTY
Nos. 7 9 4 3 2,

79491.

Decided September 22, 1964.

ARREST (Abs & O. Jur. 2d) z

i!

1. When a police officer stops a person for interrogation
because of suspicious conduct and 11frisks 11 him, by patting the outside of his clothing, solely to determine, for the safety of the officer,
whether the person stopped is carrying a weapon, there has not been
an arrest prior to the frisk.
EVIDENCE (Abs & O. Jur. 2d) - 189
SEARCH & SEIZURE (Abs & 0. Jur. 2d) - 8
2. A state may establish its own rules and standards pertaining to search and seizure so long as these rules and standards do
not violate the substance and spirit of the Fourth Amendment.

WEAPONS (Abs & O. Jur. 2d) - 11
3. The frisking by a police officer of a person stopped for
interrogation because of suspicious conduct is proper to meet the practical demands of effective criminal investigation and the safety of the
officer, and admissionas evidence of the fruit of the frisk in a prosecution for carrying concealed weapons does not violate the de£endant 1 s
rights under the Fourth Amendment.
HEADNOTES BY EDITORIAL STAFF.
Mr. John T. Corrigan, county prosecutor, by Mr. Reuben Payne,
assistant county prosecutor, for the State.
Mr. Louis Stokes, for defendants.
History : -- Motion to suppressevidence in prosecution for carrying
con_cealed weapons. Motion overruled. For further history see
Omnibus Index in bound volume.
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Friedman, J. Gentlemen, it was suggested yesterday that
briefs be filed and I stated that it was not necessary, in light of the
fact that I have given this matter considerable attention as to the law,
and the only question before me was to determine the facts so the
proper lawcan be applied.
There is no question about the facts in this case, so I don't
think it is necessary for me to repeat at length save and except tostate
that the police officer of many years of service and experience had
observed the action of the defendants which indicated to him that they were
casing a robbery.
There is. no doubtin my mind that the officer, based upon
his training, length of service, and experience as a police officer
and detective, assigned in the area which he had been placed, and
doing the job he had been doing, had reasonable cause to believe and
to suspect that the defendants were conducting themselves suspiciously
and some interrogation should be made of their action.
The Supreme Court of the United States has in many cases
of recent years expressed itself clearly and distinctly that a general
search and seizure is in violation of the Fourth Amendment unless the
search is done with a proper warrant from the court, or if the search
is made in connection with a lawful arrest and is contemporaneous and
incidental to such arrest. Henry v. u. S., 361 U.S., 98 4L Ed. (2d),
134. Ker v. California, 374 U.S., 23, 10 L Ed. {2d), 726. Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S., 643, 6 L Ed. (2D) 1081.
There is noevidence that any warrant had been is sued for
a search or frisk and I am not going to stretch the facts and say that
there was a lawful arrest prior to the frisk of the defendants. I believe it would be stretching the facts beyond reasonable comprehension and foolhardy to say there was .a lawful arrest, because there
wasn't, from the facts as presented.
It has been frequently stated by the U.S. Supreme Court
. that a state may establish its own rules and standards pertaining
to sear.ch and seizure so long as these rules .and standards do not
violate the substance and spirit of the Fourth Amendment. It would
certainly follow that the same rule would apply to the problem of
11
stopping and frisking 11 of an individual by a police officer where
the facts justify.
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He merely tapped them about the outer part OF their bodies
to determine i£ they had any weapons or guns, forhis own personal
protection, and by doing so he discovered that two of the three individuals had concealed guns, and the guns are the fruit of the frisk,
and not of a search.
In the case of People v Rivera (7/10/64)f 64} decided by New
York Court of Appeals, 33 u. S. Law Week, 2044 July 28, 1964, the
court state thata policeman has the authority to stop and question
a suspect.· 11 Prompt inquiry into suspicious or unusual conduct is
an indispensable power in the orderly goverment of a large urban
communities. 11

The frisk is essential to the stop for without the latter
the answer to the police officer may be a bullet, and a loaded
pistol discovered during the frisk is admissible.

In the case of People v Martin, 46 Cal. (2d) 106, the court
similarlyupheld stop and frisk by an officer, and the court in effect
stated the security of public order and lives of the police are to be
weighed against a minorinconvenience and petty indignity.
I may say at this time, I am a great believer of the perpersonal rights propounded by our Supreme Court, reiterated and reaffirmed, neglected over the years, and given to us under the Fourth
Amendment; and other amendments of the U. S. and State Constitutions.
But police officers in a community also have rights under
theconstitution, and rights given to them by virtue of their office,
and one of their rights as I have indicated is the right when the circumstances justify and there is a reasonable suspicion, and for his
ow:n personal protection, to stop the individual or individuals and not
search, butto frisk, to determine if there are weapons for his own
personal safety ; and finding the weapon by frisking is the fruit of
the stop and_ frisk, in the same relation that the courts refer to the
fruits of the .crime on a search and seizure. Ballard v State, 43
Ohio St., 340 ; Clark v DeWalt, 65 Ohio Law Abs., 193, 203.
I believe that I reiterate again that search and seizure
law .cannot be applied in this particular case, although Mr. Reuben
Payne endeavored to show there was a lawful arrest, but the Court
·cannot agree. If there was an arrest it came subsequentto the frisk.
But as I have stated, and I repeatagain, there is a distinction between a frisk and a search and seizure .
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In the case of Ker v California, 374 U.S., 323, 10 L .Ed
(2d) 726, the court pronounced : 11 A state is not precluded from
: developingworkable rules governing searches to meet the practical
demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement
that does notviolate the constitutional standards of what is reasonable search and seizure".
Our courts in Ohio have on many occasions expressed that
· a police officer has the right to stop a suspicious person for the purpose of interrogation. Therefore, can it be said that the frisking of
said person by the officer for the: purpose of his own safety is a standard setby our state that is violative of the Fourth Amendment, or is
it a proper guidance to meet the practical demands of effective criminal investigatioh and the safety of the officer performing his sworn
duty ? This Court believes that it is the latter view that wouldbe
prevaiiing and that such conduct would not be held as a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.
We cannot forego and forget that police officers have a job
to do, and they must do the job in connection with crime which has
been on the increase.

lj

At the sametime a police officer cannot - - as far as this
Court is concerned - - and will not be permitted to stop and frisk
an individual simply because he has a suspicion, a mere suspicion,
unless they are reasonable circumstances justifying a frisk.
This Court believes there is a distinction between stopping
and frisking, and search and seizure.
A search is primarily for the purpose of trying to obtain
evidence in connection with the corn:mission of a crime, that the
police officer may reasonably believe that a crime has been committed or might be committed.

A frisking is strictly for the protection of the officer's
person andhis life.
There was reasonable cause in this case for the officer,
Detective McFadden, to approach these individuals and pat them.
Heapproached them, and for his own protection frisked them. He
did not go into their pockets. Had he gone into thei:r pockets and
obtained evidence, as an example, .narcotics or illegal slips, there
would be no question of an illegal search and seizure.
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This matter is of great importance and of great concern, and
I certainly hope that counsel will endeavor to have this question determined by the Appellate Courts, for it is most desirable that we have
clearness with respect to this problem and that the police officers
know what they may do and can do in a stop and frisk matter.
The motion in each case is overruled, and exception to the
defendants. It is so ordered.
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